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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Background 
From 1937. many types of subsidy program in housing have been implemented 
or proposed. A common purpose is to help low-income families afford better housing. 
In 1937 the Housing Act of 1937 was passed which created the U.S. Housing Author-
i ty (Elizabeth Huttman and Willem van Vliet : 19 ). The public housing program 
wa introduced in this act. The program's objectives were to help man~' low-income 
families li ve in better housi ng during the Depression. reduce unemployment and elim-
inate slums. However, in the 1970s, ome economists felt these production-oriented 
programs entailed larae co ts serving only a fraction of the poor and that the costs 
exceeded benefits. So, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 was 
passed in lhe Nixon Administration. This Act favored demand-oriented programs 
in whi ch subsidies were paid to participants. It allowed households to find adequate 
dwelling units on the pri vate market 1 • For subsidized housing programs, this is an-
other landmark. The Act of 1974 shifted the sub idies lo participants from contractors 
and landlords, and the Section housing program came under thi s act. Fut her more 
m 19 3 Congress passed the Housing and U rban-Rural Recovery Act in which the 
1 Adequate dwelling unit are to be afe, sanitary, and decent housing units . 
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housing voucher program was initiated. The relevant statement as follows: 
The tenants received direct housing subsidies in the form of housing vouch-
ers . These represented a modification of the Section Existing Housing 
program and housing allowances . 
Among these housing subsidy programs2 , public housing is t he traditional program 
in which ownership of dwelling unit s belongs to the government. In contrast, the 
Section Existing Housing and housing voucher programs uti lize privately owned 
housing unit . 
1 .2 State m e nt of t h e Purpose and Frame work 
In thi s thesis. tenant benefits are compared for the three programs mentioned 
above. ~Iarshal li an Cons umer's Sur plus and Hicksian Equivalent Variation ( Hicksian 
Consume r·s urplus ) are utili zed to estimate tenant benefits. In addit ion, benefits 
are regressed on monthly income. before program rent. the age of household head, 
family size, race and the sex of household head to empirically test these concepts. 
The organizat ion oft he thesis is as follows: T he first chapter presents a general 
background fo r subsidized housing programs and defines some te rms. The following 
chapter presents a program overview, and previous studies will be reviewed in the 
third chapte r. The theoretical framework is presented in the fourth chapter. The fifth 
chapter present the empiri cal findi ngs and a final chapter summarizes the conclusions 
2 Elizabeth Huttman and Willem van Vliet ( 19 ) included about nine housing 
subsidy programs: public housing. Section 221, Section 312, Section 235, Section 236, 
Section new-construct ion, Section substanti al & moderate rehabilitation. Section 
8 Existing Housing, and Housing vouchers. 
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to be derived from thi s thesis. 
1.3 P rogram D e fini t ion s 
Some of the specific terms used in this lhesis are the following: 
• H U D The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
• C onti-act R e n t The rent paid tot.he owner of t he dwelling unit which is usually 
shared by the tenant and HUD. 
• G r oss R e n t The s um of the contract rent and utility allowance. If t here is no 
uti}jty allowance contract rent equals gross rent. 
• Fai r Market R e n t The rent including utilities (except telep hone), ranges and 
refrigerators. necessary to obtain privately owned existing, decent , safe and 
sanitary rental housing of a modest nature with sui table amenities . Separate 
fair market rents are established for dwelling units of varying sizes (number of 
bedrooms) and types. 
• Low-Incom e F amily A family whose income does not exceed 0 percent of 
the median income for the area as determined by H UD with adj ustments for 
smaller or Larger families . 
• Very low-Income family A fami ly whose income does not exceed 50 percent 
of the median income for the area as determined by H UD with adjustments for 
smaller or larger families . 
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• E ligible F a mi ly A family whi ch qualifies as a low-income or very low-income 
family. 
• Standard H ou ing Housing that is in a decent. ·afe. and sanitary condition. 
• Public H ou ing Agen cy (PHA ) Any state. county. municipally or other 
go\·ernmen tal entit y or public body wh ich i a uthorized to eno-aae in or as ist 
in the development or operation of hou ing for low-income fami li es. 
• Owne r Any person or en tit y ha\·ing the legal ri~ht to lease housing. 
• Ten a n t R e n t Formerly called net family contribution. The amount payable 
monthly by the family as rent to the owner. Where all utili ties (except tele-
phone) and other essential housing services a re supplied by the owner, tenant 
rent equals total tenant payment. Otherwise the tenant rent equals total tenant 
payment le· than utility allowance. 
• Total t e n ant p aym ent (TTP ) The total amount the Hl"D rent formula 
required t he tenant to pay toward the gro rent. 
• Adju ted Income Gro - income minu dependent deduction. allowable child 
care expense, allowable handicap assi lance expense. allowable medical expen e, 
and elderly household <led uction. 
• H o u sing A ssistan ce P aym e n t The monthly payment by the PHA to an 
owner on behalf of a family participating in the hou ina ,·oucher proaram. 
Generally, the amount of the hous ing a sistan ce payment is determjned by sub-
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tracting 30 percent of a family 's monthly adjusted income from the payment 
standard or gross rent that applies to the fami ly. 
• ACC A written agreement. between H UD and a contract administ rator to pro-
vide annual contributions to cover housing assi stance payments and other ex-
penses pursuant to the Act. 
• Payment Standard The payment standard is established as the fair market 
rent in effect when the A.CC is executed for the first increment of funding . 
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2. PROGRAM OVERVIEW 
2.1 Public Housing Program 
This is the oldest housing subsidy program in which units are owned and con-
trolled by the national or local government (Elizabeth Huttman and Willem van Vliet, 
19 ). Eligible families whose· income is below a speci fic standard 1 have the right to 
enter this program. The participant usually is charged 30 percent of his own adjusted 
income as the project rent. In this program, tenants apply for units vacant in the 
project; in other words, households have little choice as to the type and location of 
housing units. From economics this is termed an in-kind transfer program (i .e., non-
cash transfer program ). Aft er 196.5 , the pubbc housing program started to decline 
due to increasing cost and inefficiency. According to HUD sta t istics in 1986 pub-
lie housing declined in the amount of housing units provided compared to the other 
subsidized housing programs (Elizabeth Huttman and Willem van Vliet, 198 ). The 
subsidized housing programs shifted toward more effective programs . As a result of 
the disadvantage of public housing, t he direct cash payment programs were proposed 
in lieu of the traditional housing program. 
1 sually, the household whose income is below 0 percent of the median income 
could be a eligible household. Prescot t ( 1974 ) utilized the private-equivalent rent t.o 
establish income limits. If the participant 's income was above the limit he could be 
excluded from thi s program. 
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2. 2 R e nt Certificates 
As mentioned above, the public housing program was inefficiently operated. Mil-
ton Friedman and other conservative economists have suggested that direct cash 
grants to the poor are better t han providing specific goods or services and the free-
market mechanism is substituted for housing programs so that the subsidy to the 
poor is more efficient . In fact, the Section 8 Existing Housing program also could be 
called r ent certificates in which recipients are allowed to choose any dwelling unit 
which meets the project requirements in the privaLe market. However: the recipients 
are sti ll required to consume the face value of the certificate: that is, they cannot con-
sume more. The rent subsidy to eligible families is the difference between 30 percent 
of the household's adjusted income2 and the fair market rent. In addition, t he initial 
gross rent cannot be larger than the fair market rent. 
Based on this di scussion the rent ce rtificate is similar to a cash allowance pro-
gram. From viewpoint of economic theory we can call thi s program a kind of con-
strained cash transfer. 
2.3 Housing Voucher Program 
The housing voucher program is a pure cash allowance compared to the rent 
certificate. Though tenants with rent certificates have more freedom in housing con-
sumption. it is still closely tied to the specific unit through a 1.5-year contract signed 
with the landlord (Module V); moreover the landlord should not charge less than the 
2T he tot.al tenant payment is the greater of 30 percent of adj usted monthly income 
and 10 percent of gross monthly income. 
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fair market rent and the tenants are also not encouraged to find a cheaper dwelling 
unit. In view of the fact that consumption was constrained, the Reagan adminis-
t ration proposed a housjng voucher program in 19 23 . in which the tenant s were 
authorized to consume more or less housing than the standard; if they consume less 
then they can receive a cre<lit; on the other hand, if they consume more they pay 
the additional amou nt t hemselves. T he tenants are not subject to consume a stan-
<lard cl welling unit established by government and they are free to find their own 
apartments and negotiate with lancUords4 . 
The subsidy was mainly based on the difference between 30 percent of t he fami ly's 
adjusted income and the applicable pay1nent stan dard . The gross rent could be 
allowed to be the same as the payment. standard. In addi t ion, the amount of rent 
exceeding the payment s tandard is paid by the household . The housing voucher 
program's tenants obtain more freedom to choose suitable housing unit s, not like 
public housing in which units are t ied to spec ific location and housing types. A table 
tha t compares Section Exjsting program and the voucher program is presented in 
Table 2.1 (lVIodule V ). 
3The program is not new having been proposed 40 years ago. It was rejected in 
the Housing Act of 1937 (Fri edman and Weinberg , 19 2) . 
4In Section Existing Housing program. the government reserves the right to 
negotiate with the landlord. 
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Table 2.1: Rent certificate vs. housing voucher 
Program Component 
Subsidy 
leYel 
Total Tenant 
Payment 
Housing 
Quality 
Shopping 
Incentive 
Certificate 
Ownership 
Rent Certificate 
Sub idy amount equals the 
difference between 30 % 
of the family's adjusted 
income and gros rent of 
the unit. 
The total tenant payment 
is the higher of 30 ~ of 
adjusted monthly income, 
10 3 of gross monthly 
income, or the welfare 
re nt in as-paid s tates. 
The housing quality must 
meet decent , sanitary, 
safe requirements. 
Ini tial gross rent cannot 
exceed the app licable 
fair market rent. 
Certificat e tays with 
recipient . 
Housing Voucher 
Subsidy amount is 
usually the 
difference between 
30 % of the 
family 's adjusted 
income and the 
applicable payment 
standard. 
The minimum payment 
is 10 % of gro s 
monthly income. 
There is no maximum 
total tenant 
payment. 
Identi cal to 
Section Housing 
program. 
If family rent a 
unit belmv the 
payment standard, 
the family could 
keep the credit; 
the family also can 
shop more housing 
services (i.e., 
rent exceed payment 
standard ). They 
must pay the 
addit ional rental 
by themselves. 
Identical to 
Section Ex.is ting 
Housing program. 
Program Componeut 
PHA/ owner 
Relationship 
Contract 
Period 
Subsidy 
Charged 
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Table 2.1 (continued ) 
Rent Certificate 
The PHA and owner sign a 
housing assistance 
payments contract or 
housing voucher contract 
and a housing assistance 
payment is made to the 
owner on behalf of the 
tenants . 
The contract period 
between HUD and local 
agency is 1.5 years . 
Allowed the subsidy 
amount to increase 
annuall y. 
Housing Voucher 
Identical to 
Section Existing 
Rousing program. 
The contract period 
between Hl D and 
local agency is 5 
years. 
Allowed t he subsidy 
amount to increase 
only twice over a 
five years. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
umerous studies presen ted estimates of the benefits acc ruing to ho useholds from 
subsidized housing programs and have usually used Ylarshallian Consumer·s Surplus 
and the Hicksian Equivalent Variation (i.e .. Hicksian Consumer's Surplus). 
The purpose of this chapter is to review some st udies related to these two meth-
ods . Economists called the public housing an in-kind transfer such as food-stamps, 
while rent certificates and housing vouchers are viewed as a kind of income transfer. 
At the same time, economists have emphasized economic efficiency in the subsidized 
housing programs . Furthermore, by comparing the magnitudes of proposed programs 
they have provided suggestions to the government as to the best way to provide truly 
needy households with better housing. 
3 .2 The M ain R e vie w 
The following section reviews some papers on the orientation of the net benefits 
est imated by approaches such as Marshallian and Hicksian surplus. Specific utili ty 
functions s uch as the Cobb-Douglas and Stone-Geary will also be discussed . 
In this t hesis, we will employ both Marshallian Cons umers Surplus and Hicksian 
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Equivalent Variation with the latter di scussed in t he next chapter. These papers are 
as follows: Olsen and Prescott (1969). Olsen (1972) Kraft and Kraft. (1979) Yu and 
Li (1985), Sumka and Stegman (197 ), Mayo (1986), Bish (1969), and Struyk (19 ). 
Most of the other studies focused on the Hicksian measu re. 
3.2 .1 The Marshallian measure 
Olsen and Prescott (1969) derived formulas to estimate net tenant benefits and 
compared their estimates and the bes t measure for a sam ple of individual tenant data 
from the Federal public housing program. They also estimated the percentage change 
in the consump tion of housing services and nonhousing goods experienced by public 
housing tenants. Regression equations measured the variation of tenant benefi ts with 
family size and income. 
In their paper formulas were developed to measure the magnitude of net tenan t 
benefits under Marshallian demand curve assumpt ion. The b est measure of net 
benefit s for all tenants is 
n 
Bt = L [(P77tQ,11 ) ; - (PcQc), + (PmQm)1( log(PmQc)i - log(PmQm);)] 
i=l 
where PmQm is before-program rent , PcQc is tenant's payment,PmQc is private-
equivalent rent. and n is family si ze . This measure was derived from B 1 = Prn Qm -
PcQc -r Ji:.. D under the ass umption that the demand curve is P = PmJm. Prescott 
used the difference between the market rent of a pu blic housing unit and the rent paid 
by its tenant , and Olsen 's measure was equivalent to using a consumer·s surplus mea-
sure of tenant benefits with an assumed price elasticity equal to -1.0. The Prescott, 
measure always overestimates total net benefits and the Olsen may give either larger 
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or smalle r estimates of tenant benefits than the true measure. They concluded that 
mean tenant benefits in public housing was about $300 in 1960, and tenants in public 
housing increase the real income by 10 percent. and consume 1 percent more hous-
ing service than they would have consumed in the absence of a housing subsidy, In 
addition they also regressed benefits on monthly income and family size obtaining a 
negative relationship with family income and positive relat ionship with family size. 
Olsen ( 1972) employed ~lars hall 's consumer surplus to illust rate net tenant ben-
efits to participants. In hi s study he presented the probability of cons uming a greater 
quantity of nonhousing goods and less housing service as a result of rent cont rol. He 
collected data which based on the 196 New York City Housing and Vacancy Sur-
vey which included about 3-5,000 individual housing units and their households . In 
addi tion, he regressed before-project rent on annual income of the household. age of 
head of household, fami ly size, race, sex in sample with 5,919 observations. From t his 
regression equation , he found the val ue of the predictor of before-program rent. He 
also investigated consumption changes by estimating how much more or less housing 
and nonhousing goods are consumed under rent-control than in the absence of this 
program. In his empirical fi ndings, it is surpri sing that the 4.4 percent less housing 
service and 9.9 percent more nonhousing goods were consumed under rent control. 
Olsen mentioned the following: 
If we give up this assumpt ion that all of them live in the same quality 
housing, that is, consuming the same housing service what about this 
change? Some economists suggest that most tenants of controlled apart-
ments would prefer less spacious quarters in better condi t ion. However 
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some people think they would p refer low-qualit y laruer apartments. 
He also used a hedonic index method to find the market rent in which he regres ed 
market rent on the number of bedrooms, number of o ther room s . condition of unit. 
number of stori es. presence of elevator, location, and the age of dwelling. 
Pina.Uy he tried to find a relationship between t ena nt benefit and hou ehold 
characteristics such as mean real annual income. family size, age. race an<l sex. Ben-
efit rnry le· ign ificantly with race and sex of the head of the household. riche r 
familie receive s maller b nefits from rent control than poorer families . and there ex-
i·ts a positiYe relationship between benefits and age of hou ehold head and family 
size. He also showed us that black tenants receive larger benefit s than white tenants . 
The mean n et benefit is :·213. mean income of fami li es is .'6.229. and real income 
increased by '.3 .4 percent in _ ew York City in 196 . 
Kra ft and Kraft ( 1979) also employed the l\Iars halli an demand curve to est imate 
the net benefit recei \·ed by participants. Except for the market rent of sub idi zed 
unit , o t her variables cou ld be ob st>rved. T hey adopted a hedonic index that 1s con-
struct ed to predict the market rent of sub idi zed uni ts . They also regre. ed the 
market rent of subsidized unit on family characteris t ic . 
The empirical data rn\·ered 33.5 families li,·ing in public hou ing in Bo ton, Pitts-
burgh , ' t.Loui s, an Francisco. and Wash ington O. C' . in 1971 . The result implied 
that public hou ing tenant in thi sample experienced a .59 percent increa·e in hous-
ing consumption and a 5 percent increase in purchases of nonhousing uoods compared 
to what they would have con urned in t he a b ence of the program. In addition, the 
net tenant benefit s of monthly sub i<ly is $.52 and net benefits a percentage of in-
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come is 22 percent. They regressed net benefits on family income, family size, race, 
sex, and age of head of household. There exists a negative relationship between net 
benefits and age of head of household. From thi s regression equat ion vertical equit.y 
with respect to income is implied due to the benefits decLine as income increases; that 
is, the households who are at a higher income level experience lower benefits from the 
subsidized housing program. 
Yu and Li ( 198.5) estimated tenant benefits in Hong Kong 's public housing pro-
gram based on the 'Iarshallian measure. The results indicate that this program 
in Hong Kong has affected the household ·s consumption patterns. and the welfare 
loss is not so relatively high. In thei r study, they es tabli shed net tenant benefits by 
P0 Qa - P, Q. + Jg0• DH where P0 Q0 is the rent of before project , P.Q. is the rent 
tenants pay, DH is defined as P = 8Qh-; . a.,1 being the price and income elasticity. 
They suggested the demand curve is of P = Pa.efa, which is a special case. The benefit 
is equivalent to P Q - P Q + P . Q. - 1 ' 0 [Q (1/ a)+l - Q ! l / a)+l] under the assumption 
a a • • ( l /o)+l • • 
of demand curve is JQ1f a y •lcx . 
Mayo (1986) made a comparison of the U.S. and German experience on the 
sources of inefficiency in subsidized housing prograrns. He compared the benefits and 
costs of a housing program, so if the benefit s exceed the cost s, then a program will 
be efficient. He decomposed the sources of inefficiency into two parts one of which 
is production inefficiency resulted from resources cos ts exceed the housing market 
value. Another one is consumption inefficiency as a result of the housing valued by 
the recipients that is less than the market value of the housing. He derived a formula 
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measuring tenant benefits by means of Marshallian consumer's surplus, 
where H$ is housing services consumed in the subsidized housing program. Hm is 
before-project housing service consumed , b is price elasticity of demand, R$ is rent 
paid in the subsidized program, and Rm is rent paid in the absence oft he subsidized 
program. Moreover, he took the ratio of cash equivalent of subsidy to market value 
of subsidy to obtain consumption efficiency. Participants in housing allowance obtain 
tne highest sati sfaction , and in contrast. participants in section new construction 
program have the lowest consumption efficiency. Production efficien cy is measured as 
t.he ratio of resource cost to market rent of subsidized unit. The Wohngeld progr am1 
has the highest program efficiency whereas the public housing program has t he lowest 
program efficiency. 
Sumka and Stegman ( 197 ) derived a more rigorous hedonic rent. 
which could be used to estimate the explicit prices of individual dwellings for private 
equivalent rents. They also regressed tenant benefit against household characteristics. 
The result indicated benefits decreasing with income increasing. They also found a 
nonlinear relation between tenant benefit,s and age of head. 
Bish (1969) discussed a variety of situations that might be applicable to the 
public housing program. He applied Prescott's net benefit s approach to thi s study 
1VYohngelcl program is a kind of German housing allowances , which make a direct 
cash payment to tenants in units leased from the existing private stock or provided 
under the Social Housing program. Participants payment is the differen ce between 
lease amounts and subsidy amounts. 
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(i .e. , gross rent minus total tenant payment ). First , he assumed that p articipants had 
a demand curve with a unitary pri ce elastici ty of demand so that their housing outlay 
would be unchanged. Another case di scussed is that the tenants residing in public 
housing pay less in housing outlay t han before project rent. In thi case, as long as 
the price elastici ty of demand is equal to unity the direct benefit s should be greater 
than the increase in housing consumption. On the other hand. if the household 's 
housing out lay is unchanged under t he subsidy programs, then the direct benefi ts 
should be equal to the housing consumption increase (the direct benefits measured 
by the m arket rent minus total tenant payment). The last case is t hat t he tenants are 
likely to pay more rent in public housing than their payment in private housing, in 
which case tenant benefits should be smaller than the increase in housing consumption 
d ue to t he deadweight loss . 
Struyk ( 19 ) adopted Olsen's approach to estimate net benefits, that is, .VB = 
PmQm - P.:Qc + PmQ ,.,.. [log PmQc - log PmQm]· In addition , he employed two methods 
to estimate the market rent of the program unit. One was to use the present market 
rent of a similar unit in the neighborhood as the estimate and the other option was 
to estimate rent from the hedonic model. Income market, ren t fami ly size, and t ime 
in unit were arguments in hi s benefi ts model. 
3.2.2 Hicksian measure 
Desalvo (1971) di stinguished two cases in estimating the tenant benefits of hous-
ing programs. One case is households having the freedom to choose their housing 
units, and then pay a less-t han-market ren tal on what t hey choose. Anot.her case is 
1 
an all-or-none choice . 
In this paper Desalvo employed the Hicksian Equivalent Variation as his theo-
retical basis . 
Schwab ( 19 5) discussed the benefits of in-kind government programs m a dif-
ferent way, beginning with the ordinary demand function. from which he derived the 
indirect utility function and expenditure function instead of tarting from the direct 
utility function. He also adopted Hicks· compensating variation which is different 
from the Hicks' equivalent variation employed by previous studies. 
Sa-A.adu ( 1984) incorporated di stort ions in the part icipant ·s cons um pt ion pat-
terns in t he section new construction program in which he measured direct benefits 
in terms of equivalent variation (EV) and compensating variation (CV) approaches. 
De Borger (1987a) suggested that Hicks' compensating and equivalent surpluses 
are particularly sui ted to make welfare comparisons in quantity-const rained regimes . 
By comparing empirical results of this paper De Borger concluded that the composite 
goods approach would overestimate the true benefits obtained using the method by 
housing characteristics. 
3 .2.3 Specific u t ility functions analysis 
De Borger (1987b) suggested that housing is a heterogeneous good and the hous-
ing service could no longer be treated as a composite good. 
T he purpose of De Borger 's study is to compare the difference between housing 
service defined as housing attributes and housing service distinguished from all 
other goods {composite goods). An empirical result is that tenant benefits are 
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overestimated in terms of composite goods. Also the benefits estimated by Cobb-
Douglas utili ty functions are slightly high er t han by Stone-Geary utility functions. 
Clemmer (19 4 ) concentrated on t he disc ussion of Cobb-Douglas, the C'E S, the 
generalized CES, and the Ston e-Geary functions. He also analyzed the use of money-
income-constant demand functions and real -income-constant demand functions. 
The Cobb-Douglas (C'D) utility function is of the form U = K Ha E1-a+c where 
a is equal to the percentage of income spent on housing. H denotes housing service 
and K stands for the consu mption of a composite of all ot her goods. The constant 
1 
elasticity of substitution ( C'ES) utility function is of t he for m C[a Hb + ( 1 - a )Eb]b + C 
wit h two parameters a,b. The elasticity of sub titution is equal to l ~b ' if b= O then 
CES is t he same as C'D. The Stone-Geary utiJjty function has the form U = P;(H -
H0 )a(E - £ 0 ) 1- a + .l1. where H0 , E0 are subsistence consumption levels: it is not 
restricted on the income and price elasticities. The general CES utility funct ion 
proposed by Murray is of the form (aH b + (1 - a)Ec)d, in which income elastici ty 
is not restricted to uruty. With respect to estimating recipient benefits it does not 
provide an explici t formula for cash-equivalen t income . 
Clemmer al so showed tha t EV could be measured by use of real-income-constant 
{compensated ) demand curves. In public housing with quant ity cons traint , the EV is 
equal to zero in that the recipient is on the same indifference curve. In the empiri cal 
part , Clemmer compared t he magnitude of gross subsidy. Consumers surplus, Cobb-
Douglas EV. Stone-Geary EV. Linear demand EV and Nonlinear demand EV. The 
gross subsidy is equal to predict.ed market value of subsidized unit minus total tenan t 
payment. The consumer's surplus is measured along a Marsh allian demand curve 
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(a money-income-constant demand curve ). The Cobb-Douglas EV is the equivalent 
variation derived under the as ·umption of Cobb- Douglas u t ili ty. The St.one-Geary 
utility EV is obtained under the assumption of Stone-Gear y utili ty. The Linear 
demand EV JS measured along compensated linear demand curves and nonlinear 
demand EV JS measured along compensated demand curves nonlinear in income. 
Stone-Geary EV is more accurate t han Cobb-Douglas EV in that the unitary elas ticity 
of price and income is relaxed. 
At last he concluded as follows: 
The empiri cal work provides an import ant compan s1on of this new ap-
proach to those used by previous researchers, and suggests that utility-
func tion-based measures have no obvious advantages over measures based 
on demand functions . Both require knowledge of the preference struc-
ture and information on income, quan t ities, and prices . Both ca.n yield 
the theoret ically correct measure of in-kind benefits equi valent variation 
of income. Since demand-function-based measures have the potent ial for 
better explanation of variations in quantity consumed in response t o varia-
t ions in price and income, they are preferred to measure based on explicit ly 
direct utility functions . 
Reeder ( 19 5 ) analyzed the benefit s and costs of the Section Existing Housing 
program in which he compared the difference between equal-subsidy cash grants and 
the Section 8 Existing program. In addition, he examined its allocative and di st ribu-
t ive effects. Indifference curve analysis is adopted to measure the tenant benefi ts . 
The utility function is represented by U = [HK - Bh,k]ah.k [X k - Bx,kp-ah.k and the 
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budget const raint is Yk - Ph,j H k - F::,jXk = 0. By the process of maximizing ut ility he 
obtained t he estimate of benefits as Bk = [Ph,, Hg,k-Pi..., Bi.. .1o )ah.k [ P:r:.1X9 .k - Pr .i B:r:.k p-a i.. .k + 
ah,k l -a 1i ,k 
P h,j B h,A· + P ,,,; B :x ,k - l'A,0 . 
The data were collected from a nationwide random sample of 1,233 families 
in the Sect ion program in 1976. The empirical results indicate that part icipants 
experienced an increase of 11 percent in housing consumption and decrease of 6 
percent of other goods consumed than they would have had with the cash grant. 
He deflated nominal benefits and income by a cost-of-living index and also took into 
account a nonlinear model that included real income: family size, age. Finally Reeder 
suggested that the poorest an.d largest families receiYe the largest benefits upon this 
sample collected. 
Cronin ( 1983) focused his di scuss ion of the efficiency of subsidized programs. 
He divided the type of housing subsidy into a housing gap (income-conditioned ) 
subsi dy and a percent-of-rent (price-reduc tion ) subsidy. The former is attributed to 
the housing voucher and rent certificat,e programs discusse d later in our study. He 
chose a Stone-Geary utility function since the Stone-Geary ut ility provided an analytic 
form (unlike CES) and its price and income elasticity are not tied to unity (unlike 
t he Cobb-Douglas and the C'ES); that is it could be applied widely in his paper. The 
Stone-Geary utility function is employed in the analysis of the distributional impact 
and efficiency. Both Cobb-Douglas and Stone-Geary utility fu nctions are applied in 
the comparative analysis of demand-oriented housing programs versus production-
oriented housing programs. The empirical results show that the demand-oriented 
programs are more efficient, than are production-oriented programs. 
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Desalvo (1975) employed the Cobb-Douglas utility function to estimate the ben-
efit s and cost s of New York City's middle- income housing program. He also derived a 
estimated form of net tenant benefits as follows : B; = ( ~ )P( \=.~e )1-.6 - Y , where 
B;' is net t enant benefits, Rm is market rent of subsidized uni t, Y is household income. 
and RP is project rent of subsidized unit. He defined gross tenant benefits equal to 
the sum of net tenant benefi ts and project rent , while further assu ming that the total 
benefi ts are equal to gross tenan t benefits p lus nontenant benefits . He also defined 
t he sum of te nant. contribution (project. rent ) and subsidy as the total resource cost. 
Therefore , th e minimum nontenant benefi ts could be measured by t he difference be-
t.ween gross tenant benefits and total resource cost . He used an ordinary least squares 
approach to predict rent-income ratio. With respect. to tenan t benefits di st ribution, 
he adop ted a linear regression equation to measure net benefits that were found to 
have a posi t ive relationship wi th age of household head and family size and a negative 
relationship between net b enefits and female-headed households . 
Murray ( 1975) fi rst advocated the generalized CES utility function, 
where H and X are quanti t ies of housing services and nonhousing goods. respectively : 
a. b , and c are parameters of the u tili ty function and cl is an arbitrary scale factor. 
in which case the utili ty fun ction allows both income and price elastici ties to vary. If 
the b = c = l / d , the generalized CES utility function converges to an ordinary CES 
function. 
In his paper , he took 86 public housing projec ts m seven cities m 1968 and 
estimated the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas, the CES, and t he generalized CES. 
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He tried to test the hypothesis that the true specification is Cobb-Douglas or ordinary 
C'ES. 
To determine the distribution o{ benefits constant dollar benefit was regressed 
on real income, age and race of head, family composition, and ci ty of residence for 
both the Cobb-Douglas and generalized CES benefit estimates. The results show a 
negative sign with income in generalized CES but a positive sign with the Cobb-
Douglas utility function. Nonwhites receive larger benefits than whites and the larger 
families have larger benefits . 
3.2.4 Other re lated studies 
l\Iorrall III and Olsen (19 0) discussed the cost-effectiYeness of leased public 
housing, and provided two ways to predict market rent s. In addition to hi ring ap-
praisers or using an estimated relationship between rent and housing characteristics. 
collect ing information on the rent. and characteristics of unsubsidized dwelling uni ts 
is anot her al tern ati ve. 
Total cost consisted of the rent paid by households, the subsidy paid by LHA 
and utilities expense. The study found little difference in the cost-effectiveness of 
new, existing and rehabilitated leased-housing programs. 
De Borger ( 1986) developed three types of demand-oriented programs: a con-
strained price subsidy, a housi ng allowance program, and a combination of a price 
subsidy with cash grants. A constrained price subsidy is related to those who consume 
housing wit h a market rent between minimum and maximum levels. Households have 
a freedom of choice of housing characteristics under the rent constraint. The subsidy 
24 
1s paid directly to the landlord. The second program in this paper is the housing 
allowance, that is, a cash grant to participants. The consumers a re free to choose 
their housing units subjec t to the condition of a minimum rent requirement. The last 
program is the combination of the two programs above. 
As in other papers. De Borger also regressed tenant benefits of the three pro-
grams against family characteristics such as income. family size , and age. A nonlinear 
model was also used with income and family size. The empirical results were good 
since benefit s could be explained v;ell by those independent. variables. However. the 
regression results for public housing did not result in a good relationship between 
benefits and the independen t variables based. The author concluded that Belgian 
policy makers should consider demand-ori ented housing programs instead of the pub-
lic housing program. 
K hadduri and Struyk (19 2) advocated the new program in their paper named 
Housing Vouchers for the poor. In this paper, public housing, Section 236, and E HAP 
(Experimental Housing Allowance Program ) are compared on t he basis of 1 97.5 data 
from Pittsburgh and Phoenix. Sect ion 2:35 has the smallest benefits and the highest 
deadweight. loss in both cities. The voucher program cost less than the other programs 
and was preferred by recipients . 
Olsen ( 1971 ) proposed housing voucher programs, which might be divided into 
t hree cases. Households might be inside program or outside program . Provided 
that the households enter this program, they will cons ume exact face values of the 
cer ti ficates or consume more than the face values of the certificates . In this thesis, 
the data shov; that the participants in housing voucher program consume more than 
2.5 
face value of the certificates. He stated the followi ng: 
Some of the proposed schemes envisage giving recipients vo uchers with 
face values equal to the difference between the amount necessary to pur-
chase the desired quantity of the good on the private market and the 
amount that the recipient would spend in the absence of a subsidy. 
If the consumption of the optimal quantity of housing require the recipients to con-
sume more than the face value of the certificate. the recipients will consume less than 
the desired quantity of housing ser vice under their assumption of the participants 
spend exactly the amount of the certificat e on housing. 
3 .3 Summary 
l\Iost of Marshallian demand approaches are widely applied under the unitary 
pri ce elasticity in the theoretical part, and from which some estimates are derived. 
Recently the Hicksian measure has been widely employed in housing subsidy papers. 
Especially, the specific utility functions are adopted, complicating this analysis due 
to the uncertainty of the utility functions. 
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4. METHODOLOGY AN D HYPOTHESES 
4.1 H ypoth eses 
In the t raditional housing market1 • housing service is defined as the quality of 
sen·ice yielded by one unit of housing tock per unit of time (Muth. 1960 ). In olher 
words. we could view housing ·stock as the inpu t for the provision of housing service. 
Furthermore, l\lulh has estimated the price and income elasticities of housing demand 
to be very close: -1 and -r l 2 . De Leeuw ( 19il) concluded that the income elasticity 
of housina demand was around l for renters. whereas the price elasticities of housing 
demand appear to baYe a laraer variation3 (Lee. 196 ). However , it seems to be 
accep table that we assume that the price elasticity of housing demand is unity. 
The following hypotheses will be tested in this thesis. 
( A )The tenant benefits in the housing vouchers program are greater than in 
public housing and rent certificates due to the income t ransfer. 
( B)Par ticipants with the same income have a greater benefits in the housi ng 
1 While housing service is of primary concern in this thesis the hous ing stock is 
another market in which housing structure is treated as a commodity. 
2Some previous studies nevertheless. have found the price and income elasticitie 
far below unity. For simplicity and convenience we a sume. on average, the price and 
income elastic ity equal to unity. 
3 De Leeuw suggested the range from -0.7 to -1..5 for renter. Tong Hun Lee sug-
gested that the range from -1 to -2 for owners . 
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voucher program. Thns, benefit-income ratios by income class are highes t for voucher 
tenants . 
(C)The more income the households have. the less benefits the household will 
receive under these housing programs. 
In this thesis we follow most of the assumptions from previous s1 udies . First of 
all we assume two composite goods in this society. one is housing services and the 
other one is non housing goods and services4 . Second. we assume that housing services 
are homogeneous goods, not heterogeneous goods: that is: households live in t he same 
quality and space dimension. Thirdly, the long-run supply curves in both markets 
are perfectly price elastic. Fourth a single price prevails on the pri rnte market; this 
implies a unique H• fo r the three programs . Finally information and transportation 
cost will be ignored and both goods are normal goods and t he markets fo r ho using 
and nonhousing goods are perfectly compet itive and in long-run equilibrium 5 . 
4.2 Methodology 
In this chapter we investigate the Marshallian consumer 's surpl us and Hicks' 
equivalent variation as estimates of housing benefit s6 . The former could be observ-
able whereas the latter appears to be observable wi th some technical difficulty. Em-
pirically, the Hicksian measure requi res a specific utili ty function. However, in this 
4In fact , composite goods result in overestimate net tenant benefits. 
5 Mayo (1981) ass umed that the pr ice elasticities of housing demand are between 
0 and -1. monopoly with the positi ve marginal revenue a t equilibria. could not be 
consistent wi th t hi s assumption. 
6Hicks ( 1956) illustrated the comparison of Marshallian measure and Ricks mea-
sure; moreover , he indicated the ad vantage of the Hicks measure. 
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chapter the Hicksian measure will be discussed in a general form. 
Marshallian consumer's surplus, t he measurement of the area to the left of 
the Marshallian demand curve between two prices has been controversial for years 
(Willig , 1976 ), (Hausman. 19 l ). Despite the drawbacks' economists still widely 
employ it as a welfare measure since it s demand function is observable. Hicks' con-
sumer surplus is being employed recently, but due to its unobserved indifference curve 
economists must derive some appropriate utility functions for welfare measurement. 
Although the adYent of the approach makes welfare measurement more accurate than 
before. the utility function forms still have no consensus among economists and cost-
benefit analysts . 
The purpose of thi s chapter is just to employ both approaches in the analy-
sis and compare the net direct benefit s among the public housing, rent certificates, 
and housing voucher programs. First we will graphically. in turn, discuss the three 
programs. 
4 .2.1 Public housing 
We follow t.he di agram (Olsen and Prescott. 1969) usrng the Marshallian con-
sumer 's surplus approach. As not,ed above the housing market is perfectly competi-
tive so that at long-run equilibria each unit of housing service sells for the same price. 
Graphically, this is shown in F igures 4.1 and 4.2. Figure 4.1 represents the Marsha1-
lian approach in which the demand curve has a unitary price elasticity of housing 
demand (denoted as D ). Housing service and a uniform price per unit. of housing ser-
'One of the drawbacks is that it is not easy to justify deadweight loss . 
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,·ice are denoted as H and P , respectively. Tenants hould pay rent ( PH ) for specific 
housing services consumed. In Figure 4.1 assume t hat an eligible family pays P 1H1 as 
before-project rent . whe rea , if participati na in this program. he is fo rced lo consume 
the quanti ty ( ff • } and pay P3 H· for hi s project rent (normally, P3 H• is smaller than 
With res pect to the measureme nt of net direct benefits three estimates are of 
intere t. First. benefit s can be evaluated by the difference between project rent ( P3 H' ) 
and the market rent of public hou ing uni t (P1 H* ). This approach wa deri,·ed by 
Prescott and i denoted by BP. Thi mea urc i e tabli shed under t he assumption t hat 
the demand cun·e is perfectly price elast icity. Thal is, s ubsidy would be a benefit 
m easure. 
n 11 n 
BP = L [( P1H ' ), - (P3H' )] = L(P1H · ), - L ( P3H. ), (-1.1 ) 
1= 1 •= l 
where n represen t fami ly ize class . H* i fixed quantity pro\·ided by local public 
hous ing authority, and P1 H* is pri vate equi valent re nt. The method is likely to 
overestimate the net direct benefit ince the con ;;; umer e\·aluate unit of H along ad 
not ab. An alt e rnative is deri,·ed by O lsen and is deno ted by BO . 
n n n n n 
BO = _)P1Hil, - L (P3 H *). - :I: ( P1H i), ; log L (P1H' ). - log.,_ ) P 1 H 1 ). . (-1.2) 
•=1 t = l •= l •=1 
A third measure i the chanue in income that is attribu table to the public hou ing 
In terms of the area left of the ~Iars hall ian demand curve, that i , the exce_s 
of t he consumer's surplus under (P3 H• ) over the cons umer 's surplus under (P1Hi) . 
Thi i 
if we ubstituted PH = P1 H 1 for D , then we can obt.ain the BO e timator. 
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program and this is denoted as 
n ,,_ 
BX = 'L, (P1 Hi); - 'L,(P3H.); ( 4.3) 
i=l i= l 
From Figure 4.1 note that the Prescott measure is equal to the area P1 bcP3 and 
the Olsen measure is equal to the area P1adceP3 . Equation 4.3 p rovides a measure 
of the increase in nonhousing goods that can be purchased in the program. Clearly. 
the Prescott measure is larger than Olsen measure. The Marshallian demand curve 
is derived under the assumption of money income unchanged, and the point c is not 
on the demand curve since the public housing offer is take it or leave it at a fi.xed 
quantity: the tenants have no ~hoi ce among alternative housing un its. In otner words 
they only occupy all of H• and they cannot consume more or less than thi s amount . 
In the situation discus eel above we assumed that the price of per housing service 
unit is P3 under participation in thi s program with H· as the fixed offer. If the pri ce 
of per dwelling unit is P2 while the housing quantity provided is fi..'Ced at H• . the 
program might have deadweight loss, Y ' lir'd due to an inappropriate price charged. 
For P = P2 the tenant would consume less than H• in private market . If the loss 
(Y'Tr 'd) exceed the P1aY'P2 the participant would not enter the program. In addition 
to the above case, the another dead weight loss case might result from a larger quantity 
offered (as H·· ) at the P3 Price. For P = P3 the tenant would privately demand more 
than H•. 
In contrast, indjfference curves are utilized in Figure 4 .2 to illustrate the Hicksian 
approach. As shown in Figure 4.2 the tenant need not maximize his utility under the 
quantity constraint , H *, so the ratio of marginal utilities wi ll not necessarily equal 
relative prices. We also can examine the inefficiency of the in-kind subsidy. As a 
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parti cipan t, he is required t o pay KG and t he subsidy cost to the government is GE. 
However , if an unconstrained cash payment is made to tenants in lieu of the all-or-
nothing offer, t he subsidy cost to government is FE (where FE is less than GE) . 
The in-ki nd transfer is inefficient. relati ve to unconstrained cash subsidy. The two 
approaches can be compared in Figures 4. l and 4.2. in which t he YIE budget Line 
corresponds to P1 • the YG budget li ne correspond to P3 , and KG9 is equal to P3H" . 
GE is the same as the P1 bcP3 , and KE is equal to P1 bH* o. Point I is his pre-project 
posit.ion with utili ty level U0 . Once the eligible tenant enters t he program, the ut ili ty 
increase is to C2 ( C2 > Co) . 
Note that the Hicksian measure (denoted by a Y ' F budget line) and Sluskty 
measure (denoted by a Y"G budget line) resul t in less housing consumption than s•. 
If H" is soc ially op timal, then the income transfer at !'" with U3 utili ty would be 
inefficient compared to the in-kind transfer. 
4.2.2 R ent certificates 
The rent certificate program is quite similar to public housing though the process 
of subsidiza t ion is different . As di scussed above. public housing offers a fixed housing 
q uantity (including location, style .. . etc.) . On the other hand. the rent certifi cates es-
tablish a monetary standard10 . The participant cannot consume above the st andard. 
The su bsidy i based on the difference between the fair market rent and a fraction 
of in come (the higher of 30 percent of the adj usted income or 10 percent of gro s 
income). The Local Housing Agencies (LHAs) send the subsidy checks to landlords 
9 KG is 30 percent of adjusted income as rent. 
10 T hat is , find a fair market rent vary with family size, bedrooms. 
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directly. Under this situation, most participants should find housing in which rent is 
Yery close to Fair i\Iarket Rent. Notice that the households in the rent certificates 
program have more freedom t.o choose their hou ing style and location. The program 
probably provides greater sat isfaction than public housing for the part icipants . How-
ever, the imposition of fair market rent might re ult in the rent increase in order to 
reach the monetary standard, and an under-table trade could occur between tenant 
and landlord. To remedy thi ~ possibi lity the minimum housing standard approach 
was proposed by the Friedman and Weinberg ( 19 2) and will be discussed further on . 
The Ylar hallian and Hicksian measures are also use<l to analyze t hi s program . 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 are analogou s to Figure ·Ll and -L2. In fj gure 4.3 P1b' H"O is 
the fair market rent. and so constitutes an expenditure constraint. not a quantity 
constrai nt. Figure 4.4 can be related to the Hicksian measure. Due to the character-
i tics of this program, as drawn, thi s household elects the point m 11 . ln addi tion , 
point I' represents the bundle consumed in the absence of program with a C0 utility 
levels . whereas as a participant the utility increase is from C0 to C2 . The participant 
selects point m instead of G' si nce C2 is greater than C1 . 
The two figures can now be compared. The subsidy cos t . rnL , is equal to P1b'c'P2 • 
and the benefits nL are about t he same as the P1a'd'c' P2 . The ratio of the benefit to 
subsidy is FE / G E in Figure 4.2 and nL 1mL in Figure 4.4. Clearly. the rent certificate 
is roughly more efficient than t he public housing if thi s rat io is the efficiency measure. 
11 Us ua lly, the tenants in rent certificates consume a little less than the fair market 
rent. however, the tenants are not allowed to have a credit. Notice that Reeder ( 19 5) 
thought the tenants might have obtained a cred it, but the rule had been already 
changed afler his paper was published. 
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4.2.3 H o using voucher program 
The vou\her program is dose to an unconstrained cash subsidy, but it is based 
on a fixed expenditure standard as with rent certificates . In view oft.his constraint we 
call this program quasi-constraine d 12 . The major ad vantage in this program is that 
the participant can consume more or less than the payment st.andard13 . T he subsidy 
is also based on the difference between t he payment standard and the proport ion of 
income14 • 
Figures 4 .5 and 4.6 show the analysis for vouchers. First. we will distinguish 
the vouchers from the two other programs. Vouchers participa.nts receive t he subsidy 
and experience an outward shift in their budget const raints due to the real income 
increase (rent reduction ). If they consume more. then they mu t pay the additional 
amount by themselves (such as C'J in Figure ..J:.6) but if they consume le s . t hey are 
credited with the difference between the standard and rental rent paid (fo_r example. 
BH in Figure 4.6 ). If they consume housing service at point c, then the situat ion is 
similar to the rent certifi cates tenant. 
Next we analyze t he voucher program using Figures 4.5 and 4.6. In Figure 4.6 
the point A represents the before program rent with utility lT. Due to the effect 
of increasing income, the budget line shifts upward t o a new position defined as 
YAA' BH4 . Since the subsidy is conditional on buying some housing so the budget. 
constraint is jumping from YA.' to BH4 . As a participant, if the household selects 
12 Actually, t he vo ucher program is. in essence, closer to unconstrained cash subsidy 
than is rent certifi cates. 
13 Refer to the definition of the Chapter One. 
14T he minimum payment is 10 percent of gross income. 
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point B (corresponding to · in Figure 4.5 )15 • he mes some of the sub idy to buy 
ot her goods and faces a cheaper housing service price relative to point C and D. On 
the othe r hand. if he choose ' point D (corre ·ponding to \ 'in Figure 4 .. 5)16 , then he 
prefers housing services lo o ther goods or services, but he would pay for the additional 
housing from hi own pocket. In thi program. the household would ma..'Cimize hi 
utility at point B, or C, or D .. otice that the poin t. ' . T, V are o n the demand curve 
instead of below the demand cun·e a in the two pre,·iou. program . The demand 
curve also shifts from D to D1 .D2 and D3 (i.e .. increasing housing ervices demand). 
From the con umer·s ,·iewpoint, it i likely that th; program is . uperior to other 
programs. 
A noted abo,·e. the housing voucher participanb could con ume more or less 
hou ing and if they con ume less . they could obtain a credi t (normally, an acceptable 
unit is found for a rent le :c- than the tandard). Howe,·er. there may be a lower 
boundary to avoid housinp; consumption by the impo ition of a minimum -tandard 11 . 
l\'ext we will di scus thi s situation by means of indifference curve ( Friedman and 
\\"einber«. 19 2 ). 
In Figure 4.i point Z i- before the program and Z1 i the po ition under the 
program for tenants . :\ow. if the minimum landard is impo ed at H~ . the constraint 
has no effect on the tenant. Although the housing subsidy increase · income. the 
tran-fer is still kind of different from the unconstrained income tran fer . that is. 
15P2TH·o - ZQH·H2 = P3 SH20 = B'B. 
16 P2TH·o - QRH3 H· = P4.l .H30 = D'D. 
11 For com·enience. in graph analy i , we adopt the m1rnmum tandard in lead of 
minimum rent analysis. In fact. the minimum standard approach is much more costly 
and imposes inconveniences on tenants and landlord . 
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the subsidy formula is actually t ied to housing consumption . If the constraint is 
imposed on point H:.:, the tenant's decision is still not affected by this constraint since 
the participant goes from Z to Z1 ; the tenant consumes more than t he const raint. 
Finally if the minimum standard is put between H2 and H*. H;:/. it. seems to push 
participants to consume more housing and this case might have r esulted in inefficiency 
due to the limited resource; in other wo rds, if the participants consume more housing 
consumption of fewer nonhousing goods will result , in which case resou rce allocation is 
inappropriate. As noted before. the drawbacks of rent certificates could be improved 
by removing the imposition of fair market rent (FMR) and imposing t he minimum 
standard to keep from increasing rent. 
4.3 Summary 
From economic theory it is difficult to tell which program is best for either 
participants or taxpayers. Howe \·er, in our society consumers may prefer the subsidy 
in the form of an income transfer instead of the in-kind transfer; on the other hand , 
if there are many paternali stic altruists in our society, it is likely that t he in-kind 
transfer is p referred (Olsen . 1971) . In the following chapter the Des ·:vroines samples 
of tenants for the three programs will be empirically tested to establish differences in 
net tenant benefits . 
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5. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES 
5.1 Data Selection a nd C haracteris tics 
T he data collected are on tenant characteri ti cs based on individual fi les of the 
Des l\Ioines Housing Authority during the period February- 1\Iay, 19 9. The public 
housing units are primarily duplexes. with a few high ri se apartments housing elderly 
tenants. All dwelling units in the three programs are dispersed quite evenly around 
Des l\Ioines. All the necessary data are avail ab le in the individual fi le except the 
private equiYalent rent in the public housing1• In order to remedy t his defect, the 
Des ~Ioines Housing Authority maintains separate estimates for p ri vate equivalent 
rents by unit si ze and zones within the city and t. hese a re used for the publ ic hous ing 
program. 
At the beginning of the data collec tion we had sampled more units than the 
sample number finally used in thi s empirical st udy. In the process of selection it 
was suggested that some hou eholds with special low before-program rents should be 
excluded from the final sam ple2 . 
Table 5.1 illust rates average characteristics of the hou eholds with the standard 
1Previous studies took either an experts opinion or a hedonic esti mator . 
2 Some pre-project rent was reported as zero clue to living with parents or relatives, 
in which case t he variance in income at low rent may be very large. Sampled units 
with less than $200 in pre-project rent were excluded from t he final sample. 
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Table 5.1: Sample characteri stics for housing programs 
Items Public Housing Rent Certificates Vouchers 
Before-project rent (N = 45 ) (N = 31 ) (N = 30 ) 
$279 .73 $26 .61 $2 3 
($61.72) ($.5 .26) ($60 .20) 
Annual Income $ 564.42 $6 99 .. 54 $631 .96 
($4190.11 ) ( $2200.3.5 ) ( $2613.54 ) 
Age of Household Head 32 .. 57 40.00 3.5.20 
(7.77 ) (16.63 ) ( 12.56) 
Family 1ze 3.20 3.30 3.06 
( 1.27) ( 1.66 ) (1.01 ) 
Race 0.77 0.6-1 0.70 
(White = 1) (0.42 ) (0.-1 ) (0.46 ) 
"ex of Household Head 0. 7.5 0.f..l 0. 6 
(Female = 1) ( 0 .43 ) (0 . .JA ) (0.3-1 ) 
deviations in parentheses. By comparison, the tenants in voucher program li,·ed in 
t he housing with higher rent, and the households in public housing have higher annual 
income. and a higher standard deviation as well (it is possible that the income limit 
of the programs result in thi s outcome when public housinO' has a more liberal limit 
than the other l\\"O program ). Thus the rnucher program help truly n eedy house-
holds more than does the other two program . Other characteristics are very similar 
among the three programs; the household head in public housing is slightly younger 
and the family size is about three persons for all three programs. The percentage of 
white household head ranges from 64 percent ( rent certificates ) to 77 percent (public 
housing) and is similarly distributed within each program. :\fost of household heads 
are female (ranging from 6 percent to 74 percent ). In addition, from the character-
istics of the data file, we know that many household member are young divorced 
female with children and have income from a public assistance source. 
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In Table 5.2 the percentage change in housing consumption is calculated as the 
gross rent cLvided by before-program rent and the percen tage change in nonhousing 
consumption is obtained by the ratio of the income for nonhousing goods to the before-
program rent minus total tenant payment. The price change is estimated the ratio 
of the gross rent. and total tenant payment. Referring back to t he figures in Chapter 
h h · h · · · P bH·o · F. 4 1 Pib' H · o · 4 t e percent.age c ange m ousmg consumphon 1s ~ lil 1gure . Pia'Hio lil 
Figure 4.3, and ;;~~:~ (as consumed at H• ) in Figure 4.5 and the percent.age change 
in nonhousing consumption is the difference between P1aH10 and P3 C' H*O in Figure 
H • )' F' 5 Tl · h · PibH·o · F. 41 Pib'H · o · F ' 43 at m 1gure 4... le pnce c ange 1s P
3
c H·o in 1gure . , p
2
c ' H · o m igure ... 
d P1QH·o ( cl t H•) · p· .1 ,. an PiTH·o as consume a in 1gure ':t.u. 
Table 5.2 show - that households in public housing consume more housing (63% ) 
than in the other two programs and the households in the voucher program have the 
larges t increase i n real income ( 503 ) than the other two programs. If the households 
return to the private market they would incur a price ri se factor ranging from 2.9 
(rent certificates) to 2 . .54 (public housing). Public housing tenants have the highest 
percentage increase in housing consumption due to the second highe t pre-project 
rent and t he highest gross rent among the three programs. On the other hand, the 
vouchers tenants experience more nonhousing consumption (i.e., more real income ) 
probably resulting from the properties of the income·transfer, and due, partly, to 
having the lowes t average income. 
46 
Table .5 .2: The percentage cha nge in hou ing and nonhousing goods consumption 
Programs 
Public Housing 
Rent Certificates 
Voucher Program 
The Percentage 
Change in 
Housing 
Consumption 
63% 
60% 
50% 
The Percentage 
Change in 
Nonhousing 
Consumption 
23% 
39% 
503 
5.2 B enefits Estimate 
The P rice 
Change 
2.54 
2.9 
2.8 
As indicated in Chapter 4. we utilize the Prescot t measure (Equation 4.1), the 
Olsen measure (Equation 4.2). and the real income measure (Equation 4.3 ). These 
estimates for the t.hree program are showed in Table 5.3. Due to the demand cur ve 
shift s for the Youcher program. we must know the before-program rent change with 
the demand curve shifts3 . Es timated regression equations utili zing the full voucher 
sample had very low income elasticities, due, perhaps . to 'charity rents attained at 
ver y low incomes4 . The final regression exclude the nine lowest rent observations. 
Table .5.3 shows t he benefit s comparison among the three progr ams under the 
sample change from 30 to 21 for the voucher program with the standard deviations 
shown in parentheses. Pre-project rent regressed agai nst the income and other tenant 
charac teristics can be used to calculate thi s demand curve shift. T he max value is 
3For the three programs, t he rent -income r atio is 0.39 (public housing), 0.46 (rent 
cer tificates), and 0 .. 53 (vouchers). respec tively. Before-program rent is used in thi s 
ra tio. 
4 We did try to use frontier regression , in which case the positive residuals in the 
equation with a intercept resulted in no improvement. In the graph of before-progr am 
rent. against income, we found nine observations with a wide variation in income at 
very low rent. 
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Table 5.3: Benefits comparison 
Methods Public Housing 
(N = 45 ) 
Prescott $275.46 
($ 101.8 ) 
Olsen $227.39 
($93 .74 ) 
Real Income Measure $100 .311 
($10.5 .01 ) 
obtained from the following equation: 
Rent Certificates 
( = 31) 
$2 0.5 
($108.76) 
$236 .96 
($94.46) 
$120 .3 
( $94 .43) 
Voucher 
( . =21) 
$2 0 .. 52 
( $ 7.46) 
max : $268. 8 
($92. 2) 
nun : $265 .08 
($ 4.0.5) 
max : $298 .69 
{S ll9.23 ) 
min : $1 5.7 
($ 9.107 ) 
£ 1' Y = 0.616 * L1' 1 + 0.397 "' LA + 0.145 *Li\' - 0.039 "' R 0.4:33 * ~ (5.1 ) 
where LYY means predicted before program rent in log form; LYl means monthly 
income plus subsidy in log form; LA means the age of the household head in log form; 
LN means the family size in log form; R means the race (white = l ); and S means 
the sex of t.he households head (female = 1). The min value is obtained from the 
following equation: 
Y r = 0.077 * Yl + 2.107 * .4 + :34.587 * N + 1 .32.5 * R + 79 .046 * S (5 .2 ) 
There are two regressions representing the high-low elasticity range for demand curve 
shifts in th e voucher tenant calculations. The double-log equation's elasticity is 0.616 
and the li near equation's elasticity is (0 .077)( .525/ 314 ) o r 0.12. where the terms 
are defined as the above except in arithmatic fo rm with the predicted value being 
obtained the values are substituted into th e Olsen formula in which the max and 
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min measures are resported , respectively. In t he Olsen measure the difference between 
the max and min values is not Large (about $3), but in the real income measure the 
difference between the max and min values is about $113. Averaged benefits under 
the three measures are substantially higher in the voucher program. 
Notice that in the Prescott measure for cash assistance programs (vouchers and 
rent certificates) benefits are about $5 larger than for public housing. Public hous-
ing tenants h ave the highest private-equivalent rent and total tenant payment. and 
the voucher program has the second highest private-equivalent rent and total tenant 
payment 5 . By comparison, the priYate-equivalent rent difference between vouchers 
and public housing is about .'20. and the total tenant payment difference between 
vouchers and public housing is about $25 . This accounts for t.he $.5 difference be-
tween these programs. 
Assume that the subsidy 1s equal to the difference between market rent and 
project rent (Desalvo, 1975 ). In addition. provided that the total benefits are the sum 
of the project rent and net benefit in which the net benefit is measured by Marshallian 
consumer ' surplus (Olsen's measure ) then the efficiency index is represented as the 
ratio of the net tenant benefits to the nominal subsidy. 
Table -5.4 shows the result that the voucher program is more efficient than the 
other two programs when either t he linear or double-log equations are used. At the 
same time. the public housing program appears to have the largest cost and the !owe t 
5 Although the tenants in voucher program have the lowest gross income. the ten-
ants' payment are partly determined on adjusted income. In addition. the payments 
standard in the voucher program is slightly lower than the fair market rent in rent 
certificates. 
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Table .5 .4: The consumpi ion efficiency among the three programs 
Programs 
Public H o usin g 
Rent Cer t ifi cat es 
Vo uchers 
Net Tenants 
Benefits ( 1) 
$221 .39 
$236 .96 
max: $26 . 
min : $26.5 .0 
Nominal 
ubsidy ( 2) 
$27.5.46 
$2 0.5 
$280.52 
Consumption Efficiency 
(l / 2*100 ) 
2.54 
4.45 
max: 9.5.5 
min: 94.49 
Table .5 .. 5: The ra tio of benefit s t.o mont hly in come among the three program 
In come Range Public Housinp; Rent Vouchers 
Certificates Programs 
< 4000 0.79 0.6:3 max: 0.19 
min: 0.73 
4000 - 6000 0. r2 0.33 max: 0.77 
min: 0.74 
6000 - 000 OA9 0.21 max : 0.44 
min: 0.43 
> 000 0.14 0.09 max: 0.1 
min: 0.21 
effic ien cy among t he t hree prograrns6 . 
T h e distri bution of benefit among income cla ses for the three can also be an-
alyzed . Tables 5 .5 and .5.6 show that the ratio of benefits to monthly income is 
decreasing as income increases (except for vouchers · minimum estimate) . wh ile the 
dollar benefits s how rising estimates in the second range (.' 4.000-6,000) for t he voucher 
and pu blic ho using programs. Vertical equ ity implies declin ing benefit s with ri sing 
income so o ur programs are con isten t with thi s characteristic . 
6 Assume that the total cos t is t he sum of Lhe total tenant p ayment and nominal 
su bs idy so the cost incurred t o public housing is $4.54. , the vo ucher program is 
$434.66, and the ren t certificates i $42 .72. 
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Table 5.6: Average benefit.s di stribution among the three programs 
Income Range Public Housing Rent Vouchers 
C' ertificates Programs 
< 4000 ~266.0 1 $210 .49 max: $256 .24 
min: $23 .. 52 
4000 - 6000 $305.34 $143 .36 max: $327 .11 
min: $313 .29 
6000 - 000 $2 3.03 $122 .. 5.5 max: $255 .39 
mrn: 8250 .44 
> 000 8144.27 $ 0.59 max: 8164.01 
min: . 197 . 79 
5.3 The Distribution of the Tenant Benefits 
The purpose of thi s sect ion is to indicate how benefits are affected by hou ehold 
income and other ch ara.ct("ri sti cs . OLS regression models are e mployed as a framework 
to present these r esult s ( alternati\·e model s such as the quadratic model and dou ble-
log model a re shown in the Appendix (Chapter 9)). 
B = 230.2 - 0.2 ,.. }-, 0.31 x BR - 0.30 >< . ..t + 31.26 * N - 4.29xR + l .67 *S (5.3 ) 
R 2 = 0. 7; R2 = 0 . .S; F = -14 .02 
t values are 5.5 , -15.0 , 3.5 , -0.40, .5 .9 , 0. 30, 1.39, respectiYely. 
B = 232.24 - 0.32"' Y + 0.51* BR - 0.60 "' .4. + 22. 7 * V - 9.44 * R + 22.2 * S (5.4) 
R2 = 0. 4; R 2 = 0. O; F = 22.2.5 
t. values are 3.0 . -7.3 , 3.71. -1.02. 3.2 . -0.4.5 , 1.19. respecti,·ely. 
B m in = 10.00 - 0.l * Y - 0.22*BR + 0.92x.-1 - 46.53x.V + 6.ll·R+ 107.96* (.5.5 ) 
R 2 = 0.69: R2 = 0.55; F = .5.21 
.s 1 
t values are 0.09 , -2. 78. o .. 59, 0. , 2.92. 0.211 2.62. respectively. 
Bma;z; = 80 .3 - 0.28 * l r + 0.31*BR - 0.19 "' A + 53.93*N + 12..!1*R+69.13 * s (.5 .6 ) 
R 2 = 0.77; R 2 = 0.68; F = 8.22 
t values are 0. 79 , -4.46, 0. 9, -0.19 3.63, 0.46, 1. 0, respectiYely. 
Where B, Bmm, Ema ::: are benefits measured by Olsen measure (equation 4.1) 
Y is monthly income BR is before program rent. A is age of household head N is 
family size. R is race. and S is sex of the fam ily household head. 
Equations .5.3 .. 5.4, 5.5, 5.6 show the linear regression equations in the public 
housing. rent certificates min~mum vouchers, and maximum vouchers programs , re-
spect ively. R2 is rather large in the three programs, so benefits could be explained 
well by the family characteri stics. There are st rong negative relations with the ben-
efits and monthly income for the three programs; at the same t ime, correct signs 
and stat istically significant t-values result in the importance o{ income in the four 
benefits equations . The age of household head and race variables have mixed signs 
with very low t-values in the four equations. In addition, the tenants Li ving in higher 
pre-project housing rent should have higher benefits in the program. The elderly have 
larger benefits in the vouchers program in the minimum voucher equation1 whereas 
young families have larger benefits in the rent certificates, public housing and vouch-
ers program in t he rna..'<imum equation. White tenants obtain more benefits in the 
public housing and vouchers programs whereas minorities obtain more benefits in rent 
certificates. Larger families wit h the female household heads obtain greater benefits 
in all three programs. 
Several characteristics of the coefficients should be noted. First note that tenants 
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in public housing and in the maximum voucher program have the same coefficient on 
income; that is, an increase in 1 dollar if income leads to the same benefit loss. 
Rent certificate participants suffer more benefits loss as income increases, whereas 
the tenants in the minimum vouchers eq ualion experience the smallest benefits loss. 
Second, the benefits decline for each extra year of age in the t hree programs except for 
the linear voucher model. Benefits increase by $0.92 for each extra year of age in the 
vouchers program \.vi th the minimum equation. For all the equations, the family size 
is highly significant for the benefits, and the tenants in the voucher program with the 
maximum equation obtain the largest benefits increase for each extra member of the 
family. Finally. the white tenants obtain more benefits in the maximum equation, and 
the female household beads experience the largest benefi ts increase in t he minimum 
voucher model, although both race and sex coefficient s are insignificant. 
Finally we exclude the before program rent, age, race , and sex variable due to 
their low statistical significance. The results are as follows : 
B = 322.29 - 0.27 "' 1" + 31.9.5"' N 
R2 = 0.82; R2 = 0. 1; F = 99.29 
t values are 18 .. 56, -14.06, 5.92 respectively. 
B = 351.74 - 0.37"' Y + 33.04 * _V 
R 2 = 0.73; R2 = 0.71; F = 38.36 
t values are 10.72. -7.33 .5.88. respectively. 
B = 220.83 - 0.22 "'Y + .50.17 * N 
R2 = 0.49; R 2 = 0.43; F = 8.77 
( 5.7) 
( 5. ) 
( .5.9) 
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t values a re 4.33, -3 .50 , 3.:33, respectively. 
B = 22 .33 - 0.30 "' } . - 6 L.69 "' .Y 
R2 = 0.67; R2 = 0 .64; F = 19.03 
t values are .5.09 . -.5.36. 4.66, respect iw ly. 
( 5.10 ) 
\V here B. Y. ~ are defined as aboYe. Equation 5.1. 5 ... 5.9 .. 5. LO refer s to the 
public housing , rent certificates, minimum Youcher . maximum vouchers . respecti\·ely. 
Except for t he in come coefficient in public hous ing, the other coefficients on income 
an d fami ly size increase. 'l' hcrC' is a consistent sign pat t ern on the coefficients for 
income and family ize with the exclusion of the other \·ariable . All three programs 
prov ide greater benefit s as income declines and fami ly size increase . 
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6. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
6.1 Conclu sion 
In thi s thesis. public housing. rent certificates, and the vouchers program are 
compared on the basis of tenant benefit . Generally. public housing is characterized 
as a supply-oriented housing program; in contra t, the rent certificates and vouchers 
programs are demand-oriented. 
Tenants in public housing face a red uced price fo r a fixed-housing offer relative 
to the ot her two programs; that is. the program is a kind of price-reduction program 
in which participants are induced to consume a fixed amount of additional housing 
servi ces. On the other hand, the rent certificates and vouchers program partici-
pants receive cash assistance; that is. the two programs are a kind of income-1 ransfer 
program. Nevertheless . the two programs are not identical to the unconstrained 
income-t ransfer because their subsidies are tied to housing consumption. 
The participants are ubject to a standard requirement in the cash assistance 
programs. However. the vouchers program is closer to the unconstrained income-
transfer than the rent certificate becau e the participants in the voucher program 
can consume more or less: moreover, they can have the rebate if they consume less 
whereas they must pay additional money from their own pocket if they consume more 
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housing than the payment standard . The rent certificates part icipants do not have 
this option. T hey also are subject to a monetary standard , unlike a fixed quantity 
offered in public housing. 
Marshallian and Hicksian measures are employed to analyze the net tenant bene-
fit s of the three programs in thi s thesis. The Marshallian measure is for an observable 
demand curve whereas the Hicksian measure is of the unobservable utili ty function. 
Empirically the l\farshallian measure is preferred to the llicksian measure due to the 
observab le demand curve . 
The sample data show that most of the participants have low-incomes , and are 
headed by young, ingle, and white fem ales; few minori ty tenants are found in these 
programs . The rent- income ratio is quite high for the three programs , but the income 
elasti cities are low; thi s could resuJt from low income tenants having already met 
a high minimum standard for housing before they go in the programs. but with a 
low response for added housing as income rises. Another possibility is observation 
error 1 • From the truncated vo ucher sample we took max and min estimates applied 
to the regression model for the vouchers program. Table .5 .3 shows that the voucher 
program participant s have the highes t benefit s whereas t he tenants in public housing 
have the lowest benefits by the Olsen measure. Vouchers program participants have 
larger increases in real income; the vouchers program seems more efficient than the 
other two programs. 
The benefits regression result s are very satisfactory in that benefits correlate 
L It might b e due to the use of current income observed i nstead of permanent 
in come. It is expected that the current income elasticity is less than the permanent 
income elasticity. The other possi bility is that the observations on rent of very low 
income tenants do not truly reflect private market rents. 
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well with the explanatory variables . The regres ion model shows that income ha a 
sirrnificant inverse relation hip with benefit and brfore program rent ha significance 
positi,·e relationship with the benefits int be public housing and rent certificates, but 
an insignificant positive relationship with t he benefits in the voucher program. The 
age and race ,·aria bl es have mi x:ed signs among the three proarams. and the larger 
family and female household head experience more benefits . 
6.2 Further R esearch 
Throughout the thesi- the compari on of benefit among the three program ha 
been our purpose: howe\·er, some 11nan wered que tion remain. \Ve Ii t a. follows: 
( A) The income elasti city is quite low fort hi s study. Muth has es timated the price 
and income el as ti cities of housing demand to be very close to -1 and +l. However. 
some pre,·ious papers indicated that t he price and income ela·ticities are below unity. 
A ,-ery low income elasticity. relative to t he slightly high rent-income ratio. was found 
in this ihesi : it might result from t he -pecial low income tenants in our survey. In 
addition. the program price ela ti cities are mea ured by -0.54 (public housing) . -OA3 
(voucher ) and -0.46 (rent certificates) : howe\'er. the elasticitie are not measured along 
a given demand curve since I he fixed offer in public housina and rent certificates and 
more than one demand curves are involved in the voucher program. 
(B) Estimates have been made of the percentage change in H and the income 
elasticitie of demand. An exten ion would be to calcu la te unconstrained income sub-
sid ies in the three programs that would be necessary to induce tenants to rnluntaril y 
purcha e H' . T hese cou ld then be compared to the act ual sub idies provided. 
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(C) For voucher tenants the distinction between consumption Levels below and 
above H• should be known from the data. If most t.enants consume more than H• 
then H• is on average less than what tenants would prefer given the existing subsidy 
levels . An averaged total tenant payment for voucher tenants would come close to 
the privately prefer red optimal consumption of H. The ultimate question . of course. 
is what the socially optimal H• is, but this is not est imable from the data in our 
samples. 
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9. APPEN DIX: REGRESSION EQU ATIONS 
9. 1 Intro duction 
In this appendix we, in turn list vouchers re nt certificates, and public hous-
ing programs by quadratic and double- log forms. The following equations show the 
benefits comparison among the three programs utilizing the quadratic and double-log 
forms. The truncated voucher sample is adopted ( >J" = 21) due to the quite low income 
elasticities. The max and min equations are from the double-log and linear equations. 
respectively. 
9 .2 Equations 
Vouchers Program Quadratic Equat ion: 
B max = 44.06 - 0.02x}' - 0.0001*Y2 + 0.26*BR- 0.41 *.4.-51.90*N- 12.43* R+ 59.13*S 
R2 = 0.79; R2 = 0.67; F = 7.03 
t values are 0.40 , -0.08. -0.86. 0.72} -0.40, 3.42, 0.46, 1.46, respectively. 
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R 2 = 0.72; R2 = 0.57 ; F = 4.92 
t values are -0.40, 0.66 . -1.29, 0.3 , 0 . .54, 2.76 , 0.2 1, 2.20 , resp ectively. 
Vouchers Program Double-Log Equation: 
B1max = 16 .25 - 2.26 * LY - 0.001 * BR + 0.01"' A+ 0.33 * N - 0.03 "' R + 2.07 * s 
R2 = 0 .. 54; R2 = 0.34; F = 2.74 
t values are 2. 9. -2.24, -0.13, 0.60. 0. 9, -0.0.5 , 2.19, respectively. 
B1min = 11.01 - 1.29"' LY - 0.000.5"' BR + 0.01 * A + 0.23 * _V - 0.06 * R + 1..51 "' S 
R2 = 0 .. 54; R 2 = o.:34; F = 2.7.5 
t values are :3 .0 , -2.01, -0.09 0.8 . 0.9 , -0.14 , 2 .. 51 , respectively. 
Rent Certificates Quadratic Equation: 
R2 = 0.84; R 2 = 0.80; F = 1 .54 
t values are 1.63, -0 . .5 1, -0.52, 3.47 -1.02, 3.27 -0.34. 1.0 , respectively. 
Rent Certificates Double-Log Equat ion: 
B r1 = 12.00 - 1.21 * LY + 0.003 * BR - 0.004 x A + 0.04 * N - 0.13 * R + 0.28 x S 
R 2 = 0.71; R 2 = 0.63· F = 9.87 
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t value are 7.06, -.5 .1 6, 2. 4, -0 . 5. 0.6 , -0.73, 1.7.) . respecti\·ely. 
Public Housing Quadratic Equation : 
Bpq = 263.49 - 0.40* Y + 0.00006* Y 2 ..J.. 0.32"' B R - 0.04·· A + 31 .04•_V +9.77"'R+ 1 .41 "' ... 
R2 = 0. ; R2 = 0. 6; f = 41.40 
t value are 6.13. -6.-15, 2.02. 3.17. -0.06 . 6.1 . 0.71. 1.43. 
Public Housing D ouble-Log Equa tion: 
Bpi = 13.12 - 1.36 "'L )' + 0.002 "' BR - 0.002 "' A T 0.12" .\' -t 0.002"' R - 0.02 * ... 
R2 = 0.62; R~ = 0.57; F = 10.72 
t \·alue a re 11.73, -7.17. 1.96. -0.23 . 1.90, 0.01. -0.16. re pectively. 
